New Scientist
Carbon trading won't stop climate change
ONE day renewable energy looks like a sunrise
industry, the next, tumbleweeds are blowing around a setting solar
panel. What has changed? The price of emitting carbon dioxide.
In
2005 the European Union created the world's first proper carbon market,
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which compels highly polluting
industries to buy permits to emit CO2. The number of permits
is limited, so the idea is that supply and demand set a price that
encourages the development of a low-carbon economy. A rising price with
no wild fluctuations sends an economic signal to invest in clean
energy. But it's not working.
The price of a tonne of CO2
on ...the ETS has had a roller-coaster ride - soaring one minute,
plummeting the next. In the past year it has lurched from over €30 to
€8, and now languishes at around €10. Disastrously, such low and
unpredictable prices for CO2 remove the economic incentive
to decarbonise economies.
This
is the partly the result of the economic downturn. As heavy industries
mothball factories, energy use drops and demand for permits goes down.
At the same time businesses try to raise cash by selling their unused
permits, flooding the market and further depressing prices. French
energy company EDF recently complained that carbon markets were failing
just like the market for subprime mortgages. As a result, all kinds of
green energy schemes are grinding to a halt.
So
how do you set a meaningful price for carbon? The reality is more
complicated than the ETS might suggest, which is a problem for those
who advocate using market forces to reduce emissions. As NASA climate
scientist James Hansen points out, getting it right or wrong could
determine whether or not we can avert irreversible climate change.
Apart
from the ETS, there are many ways to put a value on carbon. You can,
for example, work out what it costs per tonne to reduce emissions. But
calculating this "marginal abatement cost" is complicated by doubts
over the effectiveness of carbon offsetting and the true impact of some
supposedly green technologies.
Another method is the "social
cost of carbon",
which estimates the cost of the damage from emitting a tonne of carbon
over its whole lifetime in the atmosphere. This has been used by the UK
treasury, and the Dutch government and the World Bank have experimented
with it. But with so many variables to account for, estimates range
from £35 to £140 per tonne. The UK has now dropped it for a new "shadow price of carbon", an approach supported
by the French government and some members of the European Commission.
The
shadow price is similar to the social cost but includes "other factors
that may affect willingness to pay for reductions", to use the UK
government's own words. It is "a more versatile concept". In other
words, it gives politicians some scope to rig the price. Although well
intentioned, it is vulnerable to abuse.
Each
of these methods has its advantages and disadvantages, but there is one
problem that none can solve. I'll call it the paradox of environmental
economics, in which worthy attempts to value natural resources hit a
wall.
The
paradox is this. All these methods of pricing carbon permit the
creation of a carbon market that will allow us to pollute beyond a
catastrophic tipping point. In other words, they require us to put a
price on the final "killing" tonne of CO2 which, once
emitted, tips the balance and triggers runaway global warming. How can
we set such a price? It's like saying, how much is civilisation worth?
Or, if you needed a camel to cross a desert alive, what is a fair value
for the straw that breaks its back?
If you needed a
camel to cross a desert, what is a fair value for the straw that breaks
its back?
The
paradox reveals the fatal shortcoming of market solutions to
environmental problems. Unless the parameters for carbon markets are
set tightly in line with what science tells us is necessary to
preventing runaway warming, they cannot work. That palpably did not
happen with the ETS, which initially issued more permits to pollute
than there were emissions and now, in the recession, is trading
emissions that don't exist - so-called hot air.
Carbon
markets cannot save us unless they operate within a global carbon cap
sufficient to prevent a rise of more than 2 °C above pre-industrial
temperatures.
Governments
are there to compensate for market failure but seem to have a blind
spot about carbon markets. They could counteract the impact of low
carbon prices by spending on renewable energy as part of their economic
stimulus packages, yet they have not done so. The UK, for example, has
spent nearly 20 per cent of its GDP to prop up the financial sector,
but just 0.0083 per cent in new money on green economic stimulus.
Price
mechanisms alone are unable to do the vital job of reducing carbon
emissions. They are too vague, imperfect, and frequently socially
unjust. To prevent over-consumption of key resources such as fuel
during the second world war, the UK government rejected taxation in
favour of rationing because taxation unfairly hit the poor and was too
slow to change behaviour. Rationing was the quicker, more equitable
option. Carbon rations calculated in line with a safe cap on overall
emissions provide a more certain way of hitting emissions targets.
Is
there an answer to the paradox of environmental economics that could
make the market approach workable? I can't imagine one, but am open to
suggestions. Even if you could price the killing tonne, it is a
transaction that should never be allowed. Economics becomes redundant
if it can rationalise an exchange that sells the future of humankind.
Andrew Simms is author of Ecological Debt: Global warming and the wealth
of nations (Pluto Press), and policy director and head of the
climate change programme at nef (the New Economics Foundation)
|